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INS ENFORCEMENT OF THE IMMIGRATION
REFORM AND CONTROL ACT OF 1986:
EMPLOYER SANCTIONS DURING
THE CITATION PERIOD
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA)' forms the founda-
tion of United States immigration policy. 2 Intermittent amendments to the
INA reflect changes in that policy.3 The Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986 (the Act)4 makes broad changes in the INA.' Among these
amendments, one stands out as the most significant due to the sheer breadth
of its reach. This provision makes it illegal for any employer to knowingly
hire, or continue to employ, any alien the employer knows is not authorized
to work in the United States.6 An employer who violates the prohibition is
1. Ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1982)) [hereinaf-
ter INA].
2. The INA determines which aliens shall be allowed to enter the United States, id.
§ 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1982), and which shall be deported, id. § 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1251. In
addition, its provisions cover naturalization and nationality requirements, id. §§ 301-360, 8
U.S.C. §§ 1401-1503; refugees, id. §§ 207, 209, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157, 1159; and asylees, id. § 208,
8 U.S.C. 1158. Even this short list of INA provisions demonstrates the broad range of policy
issues encompassed by the immigration laws.
3. See, e.g., Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 9 U.S.C.). For an overview of the evolution of U.S. immigration policy,
see Fuchs, Immigration Policy and the Rule of Law, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 433, 433-36 (1983).
4. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) [herein-
after IRCA]. The text of this Note refers to the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
as either the Immigration Reform and Control Act or simply the Act.
5. The major amendments to the INA made by the IRCA add provisions to INA rather
than change the existing language. IRCA, § 101(a) (adding new § 274A); id. § 102(a) (adding
new § 274B); id. § 201(a) (adding new § 245A).
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a) (Supp. IV 1986). The statute provides in relevant part:
(a) making employment of unauthorized aliens unlawful
(1) In general
It is unlawful for a person or other entity to hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, for
employment in the United States-
(A) an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien (as defined in subsection
(h)(3) of this section) with respect to such employment, or
(B) an individual without complying with the requirements of subsection (b) of
this section.
(2) Continuing employment
It is unlawful for a person or other entity, after hiring an alien for employment in
accordance with paragraph (1), to continue to employ the alien in the United States
knowing the alien is (or has become) an unauthorized alien with respect to such
employment.
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subject to civil7 and criminal' penalties. The Act requires employers to ver-
ify the work authorization documents of all prospective employees, whether
they appear to be United States citizens or not.9 The Act therefore affects
not only employers, but all potential employees. Collectively, these provi-
sions are known as "employer sanctions."
Since the predecessor of the current version of the employer sanctions was
proposed in the early 1970's,10 employer sanctions have remained controver-
sial. Congressional debate focused on the burdens the Act might impose on
employers"1 and the potential for discrimination against Hispanics and other
minorities.' 2 Congress took several steps to alleviate these concerns. To
give employers time to adjust to sanctions, Congress created a transition pe-
Id.
The vocabulary of immigration issues often creates confusion for those unfamiliar with the
topic. Terms such as "illegal alien" and "undocumented immigrants" frequently appear in the
literature and discussions surrounding immigration questions, but are rarely defined. Immi-
gration Control and Legalization Amendments: Hearings on H.R. 3080 Before the Subcomm.
on Immigration, Refugees and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 226 (1985) (statement of Dr. Jeffrey S. Passel, Chief, Population and Analysis
Staff, Bureau of the Census) [hereinafter 1985 House Immigration Hearings]. To maintain
consistency with the statute, this Note refers only to unauthorized aliens.
Unauthorized aliens, as used in the IRCA, refers to two sets of aliens, those not lawfully
admitted to the United States as permanent residents, and those not authorized to work. 8
U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) (Supp. IV 1986). The former group consists of aliens that have entered
the United States illegally. H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 46, reprinted in
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5650 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 682]. The
latter group includes aliens who entered the United States legally, but whose visas do not
permit employment. Id., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5650.
7. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4), (5) (Supp IV 1986).
8. Id. § 1324a(f).
9. Id. § 1324a(a)(1), (b). The Act does not, however, require verification of persons
hired before November 6, 1986. Id. § 1324(a) note. Although fines cannot be imposed until
after May 31, 1987, see infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text, employers are still liable for
failing to verify employees hired after Nov. 6, 1986 and continuously employed beyond May
31, 1987. Control of Employment of Aliens, 52 Fed. Reg. 16,221 (1987) (to be codified at 8
C.F.R. § 274a.2(A)).
10. See, e.g., H.R. 982, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 119 CONG. REC. 11,194 (1978). Con-
gress wrestled intermittently with sanctions legislation from the early 1950's through the suc-
cessful passage of the IRCA. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 6, at 51-52, reprinted in 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5655-56. Early efforts to impose sanctions for the
hiring of illegal aliens were unsuccessful. Id., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5649, 5655-56. The original INA imposed sanctions for bringing aliens into the United
States and for harboring aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1982) (amended 1986), but a proviso stated
that employment, and the normal practices incident to employment, did not constitute harbor-
ing. Id. This exemption, known as the Texas Proviso, was repealed by IRCA. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(a) (Supp. IV 1986) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1982)).
11. 132 CONG. REC. S16,912 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
12. Representative Edwards called employer sanctions "an invitation to racial discrimina-




riod of eighteen months, which is divided into an educational period of six
months and a citation period of twelve months.' 3 To alleviate fear of dis-
crimination, Congress included strict antidiscrimination measures in the leg-
islation. 4 As enforcement gets underway, the procedures adopted by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)' 5 during the citation period
appear to impose a greater burden on employers than would have resulted
from immediate enforcement.' 6 Moreover, these procedures will increase
the already significant pressure on employers to fire or avoid hiring individu-
als with questionable documentation.
1 7
This Note explains the enforcement provisions of the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986 and the impact of the citation period on those pro-
visions. It then analyzes the enforcement practices of the INS during the
citation period in light of the congressional intent. This analysis demon-
strates that current enforcement policy conflicts with the policy established
by Congress. The Note then explores the effects of this conflict and con-
cludes that the INS approach undermines the purposes of the legislation and
the effectiveness of employer sanctions as a means of controlling illegal
immigration.
I. SANCTIONS IN THE STATUTE: PROHIBITING THE KNOWING
EMPLOYMENT OF UNAUTHORIZED WORKERS
A. The Underlying Policy: Gaining Control of the Border
The impetus for immigration reform began to build in the 1960's as Con-
gress reacted to the steady increase in illegal immigration.' 8 At that time,
reform proponents based their arguments primarily on findings that unau-
thorized workers adversely affected the United States labor market.' 9 Addi-
tionally, the House Judiciary Committee informed Congress, on admittedly
thin evidence, that unauthorized workers increased the cost of public assist-
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(i)(l)-(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
14. Id. § 1324b.
15. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) enforces the employer sanctions
provisions of the Act, see id. § 1324a(e)(2), and other immigration laws under the authority of
the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1982).
16. See infra notes 114-27 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 151-59 and accompanying text.
18. See H.R. REP. No. 108, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No.
108].
19. See id. at 7; see also 119 CONG. REC. 14,180 (1973) (statement of Rep. Matasunaga)
("The proposed legislation is designed to cope with the growing problem of job competition
created by illegal aliens."). Some Congressmen, though opposed to sanctions as a solution,
perceived a serious problem. See id. (statement of Rep. Latta) ("[Slince [the end of the bracero
program] we have had nothing but wetback trouble, and I say this bill is an after-the-fact
attempt to solve the problem.").
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ance programs. 20 As a solution to these problems, Congress viewed em-
ployer sanctions as an alternative to increasing border control activities,
which it considered both ineffective and increasingly expensive. 2 I
During the 1970's and 1980's, the rate of illegal immigration rose stead-
ily, 2 2 adding to the public and legislative perception that the illegal immigra-
tion problem had reached crisis proportions.23 During this period, the
rhetoric of the debates began to change. While job displacement and other
factors cited in earlier years24 were still mentioned, 25 immigration reform,
and particularly control of the borders, became a goal in its own right,26 and
employer sanctions remained the primary legislative vehicle for achieving
that goal.2 7
Employer sanctions proposals invariably met opposition on the grounds
that they would cause discrimination against Hispanics and other minorities.
Opponents raised the discrimination argument when sanctions were first
proposed 28 and continued to raise it throughout the debates on the bill that
became the Immigration Reform and Control Act.29 Critics of sanctions,
both in and out of Congress, feared that overly cautious employers would
use race30 or foreign appearance31 as a shorthand means of identifying unau-
thorized workers.
20. H.R. REP. No. 108, supra note 18, at 7-8. The committee acknowledged that its
conclusions were based on "a smattering of statistics and educated guesses." Id. at 7.
21. Id. at 6.
22. INS border apprehensions of aliens, which are used to measure the rate of illegal
immigration, rose from 800,000 in fiscal year 1975 to over 1,300,000 in fiscal year 1985. H.R.
REP. No. 682, supra note 6, at 48, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649,
5652.
23. See 132 CONG. REC. H10,587 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Rep. Fish) ("The
public perception that immigration is out of control is, unfortunately, correct."); id. at S 16,885
(daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Gramm) (opposing the bill but acknowledging an
immigration crisis). Not all legislators have perceived the situation as so severe. See id. at
S16,879-80 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
24. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
25. See 1985 House Immigration Hearings, supra note 6, at 158-59 (testimony of Althea
T.L. Simmons, Director, Washington Bureau, National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People) (arguing that illegal aliens displace blacks in jobs at the lower end of the
economic spectrum).
26. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 6, at 46, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 5649, 5650; see also 132 CONG. REC. H10,586 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (statement
of Rep. Mazzoli).
27. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 6, at 46, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 5649, 5650.
28. H.R. REP. No. 108, supra note 18, at 12.
29. See 132 CONG. REC. H 10,588 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez);
id. at S16,891 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Hart).




In response to these concerns, Congress included explicit antidiscrimina-
tion measures 2 in the Immigration Reform and Control Act. 3  The most
significant of these provisions prohibits discrimination based on national ori-
gin or citizenship status as an unfair immigration-related employment prac-
tice. 4 The result is a statute that couples sanctions with antidiscrimination
measures, thereby balancing the values of law enforcement against the values
of civil rights.3 5 Examination of the Act shows the competing nature of
these values and the difficulty of balancing them.
B. The Theory of Sanctions: Reducing the Incentive to Cross the Border
The Immigration Reform and Control Act attempts to curb illegal immi-
gration by withdrawing the magnet of economic opportunity that pulls
aliens to the United States.3 6 The Act attempts to accomplish this by
prohibiting employers from hiring aliens whom the employer knows are not
authorized to work in the United States. 7 Sanctions, Congress reasoned,
will reduce the employers' incentive to hire illegal aliens and thereby limit
the availability of employment for unauthorized aliens.38 As the incentive to
employ unauthorized aliens decreases, so presumably does the incentive for
unauthorized aliens to seek employment in the United States.3 9 Congress
postulated that unauthorized aliens currently in the United States would be
encouraged to depart and those that might normally come would be en-
31. See 1985 House Immigration Hearings, supra note 6, at 134 (testimony of Joseph M.
Trevino, Executive Director, League of United Latin American Citizens).
32. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (Supp. IV 1986).
33. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 6, at 68-69, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5672-73.
34. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
35. See 132 CONG. REC. S16,891 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Hart).
36. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 6, at 46-47, 63, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5650-51, 5667. The Act is based on a well accepted theory of interna-
tional migration. This theory holds that there are push and pull factors at work in any migra-
tion from one nation to another. Id., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5649, 5650-51, 5667. Conditions in the sending country, generally economic instability, push
migrants out of their homeland. Id., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5649, 5650-51, 5667. At the same time, more favorable conditions in the receiving nations
draw migrants to those nations. Id., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5649, 5650-51, 5667. Because Congress considered genuine control of conditions in sending
countries impossible, the only plausible alternative for the United States as a receiving nation is
to make itself less attractive to immigrants by reducing the pull factors. Id., reprinted in 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5650-51, 5667.
37. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
38. See H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 6, at 56, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5560.
39. See id., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5660.
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couraged to remain at home.' Accordingly, Congress fashioned an enforce-
ment mechanism that reaches employers as well as aliens.
To be effective, the Act must, and does, apply to all employers, regardless
of whether such an employer is a business entity or a private individual.4 ' It
also covers those who recruit or refer employees for a fee.42 The Act does
not cover employees considered "casual hires," but this exception encom-
passes only one specific situation.4 3 Similarly, the major sanctions provi-
sions do not apply fully to seasonal agricultural employers,' but only
because the Act contains special provisions for such workers.45
C. The Statutory Enforcement Mechanism: Four Plateaus of Punishment
The Immigration Reform and Control Act's sanctions provisions penalize
employers for two different types of action. The first is the knowing hire of
unauthorized aliens.46 This offense takes two forms. Employers are liable if
they either knowingly hire an alien not authorized to work at the time of the
hire47 or continue to employ an alien who becomes unauthorized by virtue of
40. See id. at 46, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5650.
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
42. Id. As applied to recruiters and referrers for a fee, the sanctions provisions of the
statute present several practical enforcement difficulties. See Immigration Reform Act: Phase
II-Regulations: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and Inter-
national Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 59-62 (1987) [here-
inafter Oversight Ill (statements of Reps. Frank, Mazzoli, Swindall, and INS Commissioner
Nelson). These practical problems are beyond the scope of this Note.
43. The legislative history explains the exception. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 6, at 57,
reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5561. The House Judiciary Re-
port Committee defines "casual hires" rather loosely as "those that do not involve the exist-
ence of an employer/employee relationship." Id., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5661. The INS has defined casual hires as the hiring of those who "pro-
vide domestic service in a private home that is sporadic, irregular or intermittent." 52 Fed.
Reg. 16,221 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.l(h)).
44. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(i)(3) (Supp. IV 1986).
45. See id. § 1186. Separate treatment for agricultural workers reflects a long history of
congressional distinctions between agricultural workers and other immigrants, legal or other-
wise. See H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 6, at 79-88, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5683-92. For a critical reaction to the agricultural worker program, see
1985 House Immigration Hearings, supra note 6, at 129-30 (testimony of Richard P. Fajardo,
Acting Assoc. Counsel, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund).
46. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986). Unauthorized aliens are defined in subsection
(h)(3):
Definition of unauthorized alien. As used in this section, the term "unauthorized
alien" means, with respect to the employment of an alien at a particular time, that
the alien is not at that time either (A) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence, or (B) authorized to be so employed by this chapter or by the Attorney
General.
Id. § 1324a(h)(3).
47. Id. § 1324a(a)(l)(A).
[Vol. 37:829
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a change in his or her immigration status, if the employer is aware of the
change in status.4"
Employers violating the employment prohibitions are subject to a series of
three increasingly severe civil penalties.49 A cease and desist order requiring
the employer to discontinue the prohibited practice accompanies each tier of
penalties. 50 A first offense carries a fine no lower than $250 and no higher
than $2000 for each unauthorized alien hired.5 Second tier fines begin at
$2000 per alien and are capped at $5000.52 The third tier of fines, which
applies to a third offense, runs from $3000 to $10,000 per unauthorized
employee.
53
Repeated, extensive violations of the prohibition also expose the employer
to criminal liability.54 Criminal sanctions only apply to pattern or practice
violations. 5 The maximum criminal penalty is a fine of not more than
$3000 and a prison term of not more than six months for each unauthorized
alien.56 An employer, however, need not have tallied the full complement of
civil violations before becoming liable for criminal violations.57 The Attor-
48. Id. § 1324a(a)(2).
49. Id. § 1324a(e)(4)(A)(i)-(iii).
50. Id. § 1324a(e)(4)(A).
51. Id. § 1324a(e)(4)(A)(i). The Act establishes penalties on the basis of numbers of aliens
employed. Id. Violations, however, are counted on a per incident basis. A first violation may
consist of illegally hiring several aliens, and a second violation may consist of illegally hiring a
single alien. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 6, at 60, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5664. In cases involving large business organizations, the tabulation of
violations can become quite complex. See id., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5649, 5664.
52. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(ii) (Supp. IV 1986).
53. Id. § 1324a(e)(4)(iii).
54. Id. § 1324a(f).
55. Id. § 1324a(f)(l). Congress borrowed the pattern and practice violations from Civil
Rights statutes, see, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1982), and applies
them in the same fashion. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 6, at 59, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5663. One congressional critic of sanctions challenged
the pattern and practice provision as unconstitutionally vague. 132 CONG. REC. S16,879,
16,913 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Hatch). Senator Hatch's contention is off
the mark. As the legislative history points out, the term has been reviewed and accepted by
the courts. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 6, at 59, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5663 (citing International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 336 n.16 (1977)).
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)(l) (Supp. IV 1986).
57. A Senate provision tying criminal sanctions to third tier civil sanctions was dropped in
conference in favor of a combined version of the House and Senate penalty structures. H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 1000, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 86, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5649, 5841 [hereinafter H.R. CONF. REP. 1000]. The Senate version prescribed three
tiers of civil violations, with the third tier being the pattern or practice violations. Id., re-
printed in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5841. A second pattern or practice
violation would trigger a criminal penalty. Id., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
1988]
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ney General may also seek to enjoin pattern and practice violations.5"
The second offense created by section 1324a is failing to verify the work
authorization of prospective employees in accordance with subsection (b) of
section 1324a.- 9 Known as the paperwork requirement, this provision re-
quires the employer to fill out a form provided by the INS.' On the form,
employers must affirm, under penalty of perjury, that they have examined
the documents verifying an employee's work authorization. 6 Both the em-
ployer and the employee must sign the form to indicate compliance with the
law's requirements.
62
Employers must keep the form on file for a set period of time63 and allow
the INS or Department of Labor" to inspect the form upon reasonable no-
tice.65 As with the hiring prohibition, violation of the paperwork require-
NEWS 5649, 5841. The House version originally called for two levels of civil violations and a
separate criminal offense consisting of a pattern or practice violation. Id., reprinted in 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5841.
58. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
59. Id. § 1324a(b)(l)(B).
60. INS Form 1-9, reprinted in Oversight II, supra note 42, at 52-53.
61. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(l)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). The statute divides the documents em-
ployers must examine to verify employees' work authorization into three categories. Id.
§ 1324a(b)(I)(B)-(D). The first category of documents establishes both the employee's identity
and work authorization. Id. § 1324a(b)(l)(B). Standing alone, these documents are sufficient
to establish work authorization. Id. § 1324a(b)(l)(A)(i). Documents in the second and third
categories serve as evidence of the employee's authorization to work, id. § 1324a(b)(1)(C), and
proof of the employee's identity. Id. § 1324a(b)(l)(D). The employer must examine these
documents in conjunction with one another. Id. § 1324a(b)(l)(A)(ii). Thus, an employer who
examines a social security card, which establishes authorization, and a driver's license with a
photograph, which establishes identity, fulfills his obligation to verify the authorization of the
employee. Id. § 1324a(b)(l)(A). The employer who has examined the requisite documenta-
tion need not require the employee to provide any further proof of authorization, so long as the
proffered documentation reasonably appears to be genuine. Id. Congress intended the "rea-
sonable man" standard to apply to the employer's acceptance of documentation. H.R. REP.
No. 682, supra note 6, at 62, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649,
5666.
The regulations issued pursuant to this provision contain a more complete list of acceptable
documentation. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,222 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(1)(v)(A)-
(c)).
62. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(l)-(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
63. Id. § 1324a(b)(3). The time period varies with the circumstances of the hiring situa-
tion. Recruiters and referrers for a fee must keep the form on file for a period of three years
from the date of the recruitment or referral. Id. § 1324a(b)(3)(A). Direct employers must
keep the form for either three years, or until one year after the employee ceases work, which-
ever is later. Id. § 1324a(b)(3)(B).
64. The Department of Labor's role in the enforcement of employer sanctions extends
only to the inspection of verification documents and does not include enforcement as such. See
Oversight II, supra note 42, at 2-3. The Department's investigations are incorporated into its
existing compliance activities under other statutes. Id.
65. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1986). Under the regulations, the INS must provide
[Vol. 37:829
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ment subjects the employer to civil penalties.66 The penalties for paperwork
violations, ranging from a minimum fine of $100 to a maximum of $1000,
are not as severe as those for hiring violations.67
D. Employer Defenses: Good Faith and Reasonably Genuine Documents
Along with creating offenses subjecting employers to liability, Congress
created a defense for employers to raise. The good faith defense established
under section 1324a(a)(3) allows the employer to establish an affirmative de-
fense to charges of violating the hiring prohibition by demonstrating compli-
ance with the paperwork requirement. Under the paperwork provision, an
employer need only attest that the documents reasonably appeared to be
valid.6" This relieves the employer of the burden of becoming an expert in
forged documents in order to avoid liability under the Act. The good faith
presumption is rebuttable by evidence that the documents did not reasonably
appear to be facially valid, that the employer and employee colluded to avoid
the requirements of the Act, or that the verification procedure was a sham.69
E. Antidiscrimination Provisions: Controlling the Side Effects of Sanctions
The Immigration Reform and Control Act includes provisions designed to
minimize the possibility that sanctions will result in discrimination against
Hispanics and other minorities applying for jobs.7" This provision estab-
lishes discrimination based on citizenship, citizenship status, or national ori-
gin as an unfair immigration-related employment practice.7  The
the employer at least three days notice of an impending inspection of the verification forms. 52
Fed. Reg. 16,223 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(2)(ii)).
66. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(5) (Supp. IV 1986).
67. Id. There is no tiered penalty structure for paperwork violations. Rather, Congress
left the size of the penalty to the Attorney General's discretion, to be determined based on the
facts of the given case. Id. The Act directs the Attorney General to weigh several factors in
determining the penalty, including the size of the employer, the employer's good faith, and
whether the individual employee with respect to whom the violation occurred was in fact an
unauthorized alien. Id.
68. Id. § 1324a(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
69. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 6, at 57, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 5649, 5661.
70. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (Supp. IV 1986).
71. Id. § 1324b(a)(l). Congress specifically intended this provision to cover discrimina-
tion based on national origin to the extent that it might not be covered under § 703 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982)). See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1000, supra note 57, at 87, reprinted in
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5842. For example, the Civil Rights Act
provision covers only employers of fifteen or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982). In
contrast, the Immigration Reform and Control Act covers employers of more than three em-
ployees. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). Prior to passage of the Immigration
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antidiscrimination provisions also establish an Office of Special Counsel
within the Justice Department with responsibility for investigating discrimi-
nation complaints and enforcing the antidiscrimination provisions.72
The system created by Congress attempts to balance the needs of the gov-
ernment, employers, and employees in trying to solve the growing illegal
immigration problem. If Congress had created the system without further
embellishment, employer sanctions would not differ noticeably from other
statutes authorizing penalties for prohibited behavior. Congress, however,
added a complication to the enforcement procedures. That complication,
and the enforcement policy adopted under it by the INS, threaten the effi-
cacy of early enforcement efforts under the Act.
II. CITATIONS UNDER THE STATUTE: ADDING AN ADJUSTMENT
PERIOD AND CONFUSING ENFORCEMENT
Rather than making employer sanctions effective immediately, Congress
created two intermediate stages of enforcement applicable before the sanc-
tions become fully operational. 7 The first is a six month educational period,
which expired on May 31, 1987. 7' The second is the citation period, which
ran from June 1, 1987 through May 31, 1988. 71 During the second phase,
Reform and Control Act, the United States Supreme Court declared that discrimination on the
basis of citizenship did not violate the Civil Rights Act. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S.
86, 95 (1973).
72. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1986). The Reagan administration opposed creation
of the Office of Special Counsel, as well as the antidiscrimination measures as a whole, as
unnecessary and overly expensive. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 6, at 109-11, reprinted in
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5712-15 (letter of John R. Bolton, Asst. Attor-
ney General, to Rep. Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary, expres-
sing the administration's view on H.R. 3810). These provisions are examined in greater depth
below. See infra notes 133-150 and accompanying text.
73. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(i) (Supp. IV 1986).
74. Id. § 1324a(i)(1). During the purely educational period, the Act required the Depart-
ment of Justice, along with other departments, to wage a public information campaign explain-
ing the existence and requirements of the new law. Id. § 1324a(i)(l)(A). For a list of the
activities undertaken during the campaign, see Oversight II, supra note 42, at 135-37. The Act
specifically prohibited any enforcement action during the educational period. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a(i)(l)(B) (Supp. IV 1986).
75. Section 1324a(i)(2) provides:
(2) 12-month first citation period.
In the case of a person or entity, in the first instance in which the Attorney Gen-
eral has reason to believe that the person or entity may have violated subsection (a)
of this section during the subsequent 12-month period, the Attorney General shall
provide a citation to the person or entity indicating that such a violation or violations
may have occurred and shall not conduct any proceeding, nor issue any order, under
this section on the basis of such alleged violation or violations.
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the Act required the Attorney General to issue a citation, or written warn-
ing, to employers who may have violated the hiring prohibitions.76 Under
the statute, no fines or penalties attached to a first violation during the cita-
tion period." Employers were subject, however, to penalties for a second
violation during the citation period.7 8 Such a second violation was treated as
if it were a first violation in the strict enforcement period.7 9 Thus, the cita-
tion was a hybrid between an educational device and an enforcement tool.
The interposition of the citation period between the purely educational
period and the strict enforcement period raises the question of what purpose
Congress intended citations to serve. While the congressional intent is not
wholly clear, close examination of the statute and its legislative history indi-
cates that Congress intended citations to serve a largely educational func-
tion.8 o The INS, however, used the citation as an enforcement tool.8 I A
thorough analysis of how INS used the citation, as compared to the intent of.
Congress in creating it, leads to the conclusion that the INS enforcement
policy could undermine the effectiveness of employer sanctions in preventing
illegal immigration and could conceivably trigger the Act's sunset
provisions."
III. INS POLICY DURING THE CITATION PERIOD:
IMMEDIATE ENFORCEMENT
As it relates to initiating investigations, INS enforcement during the cita-
tion period followed the path marked by Congress. As a first step, the INS
received a complaint that a given employer was hiring or employing undocu-
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1000, supra note 57, at 86, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5841; H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 6, at 58, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5662.
79. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 6, at 58, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 5649, 5662. Thus, first tier penalties, supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text,
are applicable to a second violation in the citation period.
80. See infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
81. The INS does this in two ways. First, it uses the citation as evidence of a violation of
the prohibition against continuing to employ an unauthorized alien established under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1986). See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text. Perhaps more
seriously, the INS also uses the citation as a de facto cease and desist order. See infra notes
110-17 and accompanying text.
82. The statute calls for the Comptroller General of General Accounting Office (GAO) to
submit annual reports to Congress on the Act's effectiveness. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(j)(l)(A) (Supp.
IV 1986). The GAO reports will include a determination as to whether the implementation of
the Act has resulted in a pattern of discrimination. Id. § 1324a(j)(2). If GAO determines that
employer sanctions have caused discrimination, Congress may terminate the sanctions provi-
sions by passing a joint resolution under expedited procedures. Id. § 1324a()-(n).
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mented aliens."3 Alternatively, the INS investigated violations on its own
initiative.8 4 If, on the evidence available,85 the INS determined that a viola-
tion had occurred, it issued a citation to the employer.8 6 If a subsequent
investigation revealed further violations, the employer was subject to the
penalties that apply to a first tier violation.17 While judicial review of cita-
tions is not available,8 8 the statute calls for both judicial and administrative
review of fines.89 In accordance with the requirements of the Act, the regu-
lations establish the procedures for initiating administrative review of fines.'
Congress also expected the INS to provide administrative review of cita-
tions.9 ' The INS, however, provides no such review.92 This single step
marks a critical divergence from the congressional intent underlying cita-
tions. Without administrative review, the employer has no opportunity to
challenge the citation unless and until the INS attempts to impose fines for
the alleged violation. This allows the INS to use the citation as both evi-
dence of a knowing violation and as a de facto cease and desist order. These
practices accelerate the strict enforcement of sanctions into the citation pe-
riod without the benefit of the procedural restraints Congress placed on the
INS.
83. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1986); 52 Fed. Reg. 16,225 (1987) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.9(a)).
84. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,225 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.9(b)).
85. One of the problems with enforcement during the citation period was that the INS has
not yet produced guidelines as to what standard it uses to determine whether evidence of a
violation is reasonably valid. Congress expected the Attorney General to issue such guidelines,
complete with examples. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 6, at 58, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5662. As a result, employers have less guidance than Congress
intended in determining what evidence might be used against them.
86. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,225 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.9(c)). The language of
the regulations differs from that of the statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(i)(2) (Supp. IV 1986), in that
the statute uses the phrase "may have violated," id., while the INS regulations use "has vio-
lated." 52 Fed. Reg. 16,225 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.9(c)). The distinction is
significant. Under the congressional language, a citation can be issued where a practice is
questionable, but not plainly a violation; this suggests the intent that citations serve primarily
as notice of the existence of the law or of a violation. The regulatory focus on an absolute
finding that a violation has occurred indicates INS intention to begin strict enforcement
immediately.
87. Penalties for a first tier violation range from $250 to $2000 per unauthorized worker.
Supra note 51 and accompanying text.
88. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 6, at 58, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 5649, 5662.
89. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(3), (6), (7) (Supp. IV 1986).
90. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,225 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.9(d)).
91. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 6, at 58, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 5649, 5662.
92. The form on which the INS issues citations declares that no review is available to the
employer so cited. INS Form 1-762.
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A. Citations as Evidence of a Knowing Violation
There are two elements of the offense of knowingly employing an unau-
thorized worker.93 First, the employer must have hired or continued to em-
ploy an unauthorized worker. Second, the employer must have done so
knowing that the employee was not authorized to work.94 The INS enforce-
ment policy transforms the citation into evidence of the second element of
the offense under the following scenario.
When, after having issued a citation to an employer, the INS alleges that
the employer has violated the knowing employment prohibition, the process
of assessing fines is begun by the issuance to the employer of a Notice of
Intent to Fine.95 At this point, the Act entitles the employer to raise the
good faith defense. 96 The INS attempts to negate that defense by fining the
employer for continuing to employ those aliens with respect to whom the
employer received a citation. 97 Under the INS practice, the employer can be
said to have known of the employee's unauthorized status from the time the
INS issued the citation. If courts accept this view, the INS can complete its
case against an employer by demonstrating that the named employee or em-
ployees were not in fact authorized to work in the United States.98 While
there is some superficial logic to the INS position, analysis of the statute and
its legislative history demonstrates that Congress never intended the citation
provisions to serve this purpose.
Section 1324a(i)(2) 99 explicitly provides that the Attorney General shall
not base any proceedings or orders on the allegations contained in a cita-
tion."° If the citation is used as evidence of the violation, the proceedings
are based on the citation, and therefore contrary to the plain meaning of the
statutory language. Moreover, it is doubtful that Congress intended the con-
tinuing-to-employ violation to include the continued employment of an alien
the INS has identified as unauthorized to work. That set of circumstances is
addressed directly by the specific authorization to issue cease and desist or-
ders.1 ° ' The continuing-to-employ language explicitly refers to aliens law-
93. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A), (2) (Supp. IV 1986).
94. Id.
95. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,225 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.9(c)).
96. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1986); see also supra notes 68-69 and accompanying
text.
97. This is made clear by the citation form, which states that employers who fail to cor-
rect their violations will be issued a Notice of Intent to Fine. INS Form 1-762.
98. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(l)(A), (2) (Supp. IV 1986).
99. See id. § 1324a(f).
100. Id.
101. Id. § 1324a(e)(4) (Supp. IV 1986). The Act mandates the use of cease and desist
orders as an enforcement mechanism. Id.
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fully hired, but subsequently rendered ineligible for employment due to a
change in their immigration status.' °2 It covers nonimmigrant temporary
workers and aliens, such as students, who are authorized to work incident to
their primary reason for being admitted into the United States but whose
authorization expires. Thus, the use of the continuing-to-employ provision
to prosecute what is essentially a paragraph one violation requires considera-
ble twisting of the statutory language.
This statutory reading is consistent with the legislative history. The
House Judiciary Committee report that accompanied the legislation de-
scribes, in three paragraphs devoted to the citation period, the intended use
of the citation: it notifies the employer of the existence of a federal law re-
quiring the employer to refrain from hiring illegal aliens'0 3 and informs the
employer that further violations could result in the imposition of sanc-
tions."° These anticipated uses indicate that the citation period was not
meant to be a part of the strict enforcement phase, but a part of the educa-
tional program. The juxtaposition of the educational and citation provi-
sions, which appear in the same subsection, 10 5 further supports the view that
both provisions are meant to serve similar purposes.'o6
This is not to suggest that a citation is wholly without significance in the
enforcement program. Rather, it suggests that Congress did not intend for
the citation to serve as evidence of a violation with regard to specific employ-
ees, but as evidence of the fact that specific employers knew of the law's
existence and their responsibilities under it.'0 7 Tfius, the citation period,
having served its educational role in reference to cited employers, ceases as
far as those employers are concerned. ' 8 In other words, receipt of the cita-
tion by an employer effectively ends the citation period as to that employer.
This construction of the statute gives full effect to the Congressional intent
102. Under those circumstances, the Act obligates the employer to discontinue the alien's
employment. Id. § 1324a(a)(2). Subsection (2) states: "It is unlawful for a person or entity,
after hiring an alien for employment in accordance with paragraph (1), to continue to employ
the alien in the United States knowing the alien is (or has become) an unauthorized alien with
respect to such employment." Id. (emphasis added).
103. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 6, at 58, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 5649, 5662.
104. Id., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5662.
105. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(i) (Supp. IV 1986).
106. Cf. Bryant Dev. Assoc. v. Dagel, 166 Mont. 252, 258, 531 P.2d 1320, 1324 (1975) (the
two sections' close proximity indicates a legislative intent that they be read together).
107. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 6, at 58, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 5649, 5662. The Conference Report refers to the second phase of sanctions as the
notice and warning period, with the word "citation" in parentheses. H.R. CONF. REP. 1000,
supra note 57, at 85, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5840.
108. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 6, at 58, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 5649, 5662.
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to have both a meaningful educational period and to prevent employers from
receiving a free ride during the citation period."°9
B. Citations as a De Facto Cease and Desist Order
The INS enforcement procedures have another, more serious impact be-
yond the use of citations as evidence of a continuing-to-employ violation. As
now employed by the INS, the citation is a de facto cease and desist order,
requiring the employer to correct alleged violations of the law or suffer fur-
ther penalties." 0 As these orders are not subject to either administrative or
judicial review,"1 they strip the employer of the good faith defense provided
by the statute." 2 They also deprive employees of the antidiscrimination pro-
tections which Congress enacted.' 3 This use of the citation seems clearly
outside the scope of congressional intent.
1. Dismantling the Good Faith Defense
The form on which the INS issues citations states, in the final paragraph,
that a Notice of Intent to Fine will be issued if the employer does not correct
the listed violations prior to the agency's next visit." 4 This seemingly simple
statement requires employers cited for an unlawful hiring, as opposed to a
paperwork violation,"' either to dismiss the employee or face a fine. The
statement is effectively an INS order to the employer to cease and desist
from employing a given individual or individuals." 6 There is simply no
other way for an employer to achieve compliance for a hiring violation. 117
109. Read together, the educational and citation provisions serve the twin goals of volun-
tary compliance, id. at 56, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5660,
and meaningful enforcement. Id at 46-47, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5649, 5650-51.
110. INS Form 1-762.
111. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
112. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1986).
113. Id. § 1324b(a)(2).
114. INS Form 1-762.
115. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (Supp. IV 1986). A paperwork violation can be corrected by
filling out the proper forms.
116. Although not described as a cease and desist order, the citation operates in the same
fashion as such orders. Compare INS Form 1-762 with 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2) (describing a
cease and desist order under the Home Owner's Loan Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982)).
117. If the employer could challenge the citation at the time he or she receives it, a factual
defense could be raised based on the employee's status. See H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 6,
at 57, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5661 (noting that even if
employer chooses not to raise a good faith defense, the burden of proving a violation remains
on the government). That is, the employer could argue that the employee was authorized to
work and the INS erred in finding to the contrary. Without this opportunity to challenge the
citation, the employer must abide by the INS' determination of the employee's status.
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To the extent the individual employer acted in good faith in hiring the em-
ployee, this requirement has disturbing consequences for both employers and
their current or potential employees. Understanding these consequences re-
quires an examination of the mechanics of the verification program and the
good faith defense. This examination strongly suggests that Congress did
not intend to place the burden of discharging employees on the employer
during the citation period.
Under the verification procedures outlined in the statute,"' as described
in the House Judiciary Committee report,1" 9 employers uncertain of a spe-
cific employee's documents are encouraged to hire the employee subject to
verification of the employee's status.120 Congress included this provision to
protect both employers and employees. 12 1 The provision protects the em-
ployer by providing that employers may accept documents that reasonably
appear to be facially genuine. 122 The provision protects the employee by
preventing the employer from requiring any more than the minimum docu-
mentation the statute mandates.123 In this way, Congress balanced the em-
ployer's concerns against the employee's concerns by minimizing the risk to
both. The INS upsets the balance of the equation by using the citation to
force employers to correct their alleged violations. Under this practice, the
employer risks being fined; the employee risks being fired or simply not hired
in the first place.
The verification system is the basis for the statutorily provided good faith
defense.' 24 The statute imposes no liability on an employer who makes an
honest attempt to verify the employee's documents. 25 However, the INS,
by using the citation as it does, virtually eliminates the defense by denying
the employer the opportunity to raise it.
According to the citation form, citations are not reviewable.126 Moreover,
should the employer retain the employee(s), with respect to whom the INS
issued a citation, and challenge a subsequent fine, a successful good faith
defense may not fully protect the employer. If a court were to accept the
118. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1), (2) (Supp. IV 1986).
119. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 6, at 60-62, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5664-66.
120. Id. at 61, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5665.
121. Id. at 62, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5666.
122. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
123. Id. The assertion that the provision protects employees as well as employers was not
universally accepted by critics of the sanctions provisions. See 1985 House Immigration Hear-
ings, supra note 6, at 126 (testimony of Richard P. Fajardo, Acting Assoc. Counsel, Mexican
American Legal and Educational Defense Fund).
124. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(c) (Supp. IV 1986); see supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
125. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
126. INS Form 1-762.
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INS' use of the citation as evidence of continuing to employ an unauthorized
worker,' 27 the employer would still be liable for that violation. Beyond its
direct effect on employers, evisceration of the good faith defense has an ad-
verse impact on both current and potential employees.
2. Promoting Discrimination
The assumption that government pressure on the employer will modify
employer hiring practices is at the very core of the sanctions provisions. 2 '
Congress expected sanctions to induce employers to stop employing unau-
thorized workers. 129 A necessary adjunct to this intent is the possibility that
the behavior, as modified, will take the form of refusing to hire Hispanics or
other individuals who appear foreign.' 30 Congress recognized this possibil-
ity and took several steps to preclude it. Among those steps is the protection
afforded to employers by the good faith defense.' 3' Other provisions more
explicitly reach the issue of discrimination. 3 2 If one accepts the basic prem-
ise that some discrimination is likely to result from the imposition of sanc-
tions, then one must also accept the corollary that the INS enforcement
program will result in an increase in discrimination. From the statute and
the legislative history, it is clear that Congress intended to avoid this result,
even at the risk of doing away with sanctions.
a. Congressional Determination to Prevent Discrimination
Throughout the debate on immigration reform, congressional opponents
of the sanctions provisions expressed concern that these provisions would
result in job discrimination, particularly against Hispanics, based on alienage
or simply a foreign appearance. 3 3 Interested commentators and political
activists echoed these concerns. 134 In response, 35 Congress adopted several
measures specifically designed to alleviate the perceived problem. The major
127. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
129. Id.
130. Critics of the sanctions plan expressed this precise fear. See supra notes 28-31 and
accompanying text. Anecdotal evidence supports the critics' contentions. See 1985 House
Immigration Hearings, supra note 6, at 138-47.
131. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
132. See infra notes 137-50 and accompanying text.
133. See 132 CONG. REC. H10,587 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Rep. Edwards);
i at S16,421 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1986) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (criticizing the legislation
as "an undeserved slap at millions of Hispanic citizens"). Concern over discrimination was
not limited to worries over Hispanic citizens, but included fears of discrimination against
Asians as well. See id. at H10,590 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Rep. Roybal); see
also supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
134. See 1985 House Immigration Hearings supra note 6, at 116 (statement of Raul
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provision establishes discrimination on the basis of citizenship status or na-
tional origin as an unfair immigration-related employment practice.'
3 6
The antidiscrimination provisions prohibit employers from discriminating
against individuals on the basis of national origin 137 or citizenship status,
38
unless, of course, the individual lacks the authorization necessary to work in
the United States. 3' The provisions create a Special Counsel within the
Justice Department to investigate and prosecute immigration-related dis-
crimination cases."' The provisions also authorize the issuance of orders
requiring the employer to retain the names and addresses of all job appli-
cants for up to three years, 4 ' reinstate employees with back pay,'42 and pay
civil penalties up to $2000 for each individual discriminated against.' 43 The
legislation further authorizes private actions against employers if the Special
Counsel does not file a complaint.'" The statute's antidiscrimination provi-
sions are tied explicitly to the sanctions by the termination clauses of those
provisions. 45 Those clauses provide that the protections will expire if Con-
gress terminates employer sanctions pursuant to section 1324a(1 ) "46 or if the
Comptroller General determines that no discrimination results from em-
ployer sanctions, and Congress approves the report by joint resolution. 
7
Passage of the antidiscrimination provisions reflects both a recognition that
sanctions provide a potential for discrimination and a determination to pre-
clude that result.
The statute's other provisions also reflect this determination. Under a so-
called "soft" sunset procedure, Congress can eliminate the sanctions provi-
Yzaguirre, President, National Council of La Raza); see, e.g., J. Huerta, Immigration Policy
and Employer Sanctions, 44 U. Prrr. L. REV. 507, 512 (1983).
135. See 132 CONG. REC. H10,584 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Rep. Rodino).
136. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (Supp. IV 1986). For further analysis of the antidiscrimination pro-
visions, including standards of proof and private rights of action, see Comment, The Unfair
Immigration-Related Employment Practices Provision: A Modicum of Protection Against Natu-
ral Origin and Citizenship Status Discrimination, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1025, 1039-50 (1987).
137. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
138. Id. § 1324b(a)(l)(B).
139. Id. § 1324b(a)(l). Under these circumstances, the Act obligates the employer to dis-
criminate against such an individual. Id. In reality, that is the point of employer sanctions.
140. Id. § 1324b(c).
141. Id. § 1324b(g)(2)(B)(ii).
142. Id. § 1324b(g)(B)(iii).
143. Id. § 1324b(g)(2)(B)(iv)(II). The $2000 fine applies to a second discrimination viola-
tion. Id. A first offense is punishable by a fine of no more than $1,000. Id.
§ 1324b(g)(2)(B)(iv)(I).
144. Id. § 1324b(d)(2).
145. Id. § 1324b(k)(1); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1000, supra note 57, at 86-88, re-
printed in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5841-43.
146. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(k)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
147. Id. § 1324b(k)(2).
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sions altogether, either through a vote following the General Accounting
Office report on discrimination called for in the statute, 14 8 or through a fast
track mechanism set out in the statute. 149 As Congress has the power to
repeal any law that it has the power to make, the Act's sunset provision can
be interpreted as an almost symbolic gesture designed to reflect congres-
sional concern about the discrimination problem inherent in employer
sanctions.150
b. Undermining the Congressional Commitment
Use of the citation as a cease and desist order does not comport with the
congressional commitment to prevent discrimination under the sanctions
provisions. This assertion is supported by comparing the procedural protec-
tions afforded under the statutory authorization of cease and desist orders
with the lack of protection under the INS procedures.
Under the statute, orders pursuant to a violation of the employment
prohibitions' 5 ' must include both a cease and desist order and a Notice of
Intent to Fine. 52 The employer is entitled to a hearing before an adminis-
trative law judge before either becomes final'5 3 in accordance with the notice
and hearing provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 554, which is part of the Administrative
Procedure Act.'5 4 Judicial review of the administrative law judge's final or-
der is also available.' 55 This system inextricably links the employer's inter-
ests to those of the employee. In order to challenge the civil penalty
imposed, the employer must challenge the cease and desist order. To protect
his or her interest, the employer must challenge the finding that the em-
ployee is not authorized to work. Thus, it is in the employer's best interest
to retain the employee until the process of appeal is completed.
In contrast, the enforcement system established by the INS divorces the
cease and desist order, through the use of the citation, from the application
of penalties.' 56 In doing so, this enforcement system eliminates the em-
148. Id. § 1324a(j)(2).
149. Id. § 1324a(1). Subsections (m) and (n) provide expedited procedures for the consid-
eration of terminating employer sanctions in the House of Representatives and the Senate. Id.
§ 1324b(m), (n).
150. As one of the sponsors of the legislation pointed out, the Act's antidiscrimination
provisions are unique in that they address potential future discrimination, rather than redress
past discrimination. 132 CONG. REC. H10,584 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Rodino).
151. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(l)(A), (2) (Supp. IV 1986).
152. Id. § 1324a(e)(4)(A).
153. Id. § 1324a(e)(3).
154. Id. § 1324a(e)(3)(B).
155. Id. § 1324a(e)(7).
156. See supra notes 110-27 and accompanying text.
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ployer's incentive to challenge the order, 1" making the employer's interest
antithetical to that of the employee. Given no more information than that
which appears on the face of the citation, 15 8 the employer must decide
whether to retain an employee named in a citation and await further action,
in the form of a Notice of Intent to Fine, or discharge the employee. A
rational employer, in the absence of a compelling reason to retain such an
employee, might well choose to discharge the employee. 59 It is precisely
this result that Congress intended to prevent when it enacted the Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act.
IV. CONCLUSION
Uncontrolled immigration, legal or illegal, presents real problems for the
United States. The Immigration Reform and Control Act may diminish the
impact of those problems through employer sanctions, which are a credible
deterrent to illegal immigration. Congress, however, chose to temper the
means of controlling illegal immigration with provisions designed to prevent
discrimination. The Act thus balances the competing values of sovereignty,
as expressed by the need to secure the nation's borders, and civil rights, as
expressed by the determination not to sacrifice those rights for the sake of
immigration law enforcement.
The INS enforcement policy frequently ignores not only the Act's under-
lying equilibrium of values, but the more specific congressional mandates as
well. By accelerating strict enforcement without procedural safeguards for
employers, the INS increases the pressure on employers to deny employment
to individuals who are, or appear to be, aliens. This clearly is not what
Congress intended. The INS should restructure its policy to realign it with
congressional intent. Failure to do so could undermine the Act's
effectiveness.
If the INS pursues its present course, the courts should, and probably will,
invalidate INS enforcement actions as contrary to the congressional intent.
As this occurs, undocumented aliens, and those who employ them, will per-
ceive sanctions as unenforceable. On the political level, the INS policy bol-
157. In fact, the INS scheme precludes review, thereby eliminating the opportunity, as well
as the incentive, to challenge a citation. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
158. The size of the citation form, which is only 8 1/2" x 11", precludes the possibility that
the INS will offer extensive evidence of a violation. INS Form 1-762.
159. Very little hard evidence of discrimination resulting from the sanctions provisions
exists. In the first suit filed under the antidiscrimination provisions, however, the Special
Counsel alleged that an employer kept two lists of applicants for pilot positions, one of citizens
and another of noncitizens. Wash. Post, Jan. 19, 1988, at A13, col. 1. If the allegations are
true, the situation suggests that at least some employers will try to avoid sanctions by avoiding
or firing employees who are aliens, or who are thought to be aliens. ,
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sters the arguments of the sanctions program's critics. While congressional
opponents of sanctions may lack the votes to implement the Act's sunset
procedures, any sign of retreat from the employer sanctions program will
send a signal that sanctions are not to be a permanent part of United States
immigration policy. In either case, current INS policy generates uncertainty
and ongoing controversy, both of which undermine the Immigration Reform
and Control Act's deterrent effect.
Michael X Marinelli

